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A b s t r a c t :           
 
In this paper the incremental values of water are calculated for irrigators in the Fish-
Sundays Scheme of South Africa’s Eastern Cape province. The socio-political pressure 
for redistribution of agricultural resources provided the imperative for this study. The 
model of the Fish-Sundays Scheme reflects a survey of 50 000ha of fodder and citrus 
production. It explicitly models the water demand on sixteen typical farms, for five 
irrigation technologies, six crops and four livestock activities. The existing allocation 
generates an average value of R0.0423/m
3/year, which increases to R0.0681/m
3/year if 
farmer-to-farmer trading is allowed given existing infrastructure. Unrestricted trade raises 
the average value to R0.0719/m
3/year. The marginal cost of additional water in the source 
basin is R0.05/m
3/year for the first 315 million m
3 and R1.27/m
3/year to extend capacity 
beyond that.  
 
 
JEL classification: Q15, Q12,  
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Internationally competition for water is increasing. Howe (1985) first suggested 
that water taken from irrigation rarely has major costs for agriculture, but despite rising 
dam construction costs, irrigation still dominates water use in South Africa. Apartheid’s 
legacy of unequal resource access gives water reform especially great priority in South 
Africa. The National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) and Water Services Act (Act 108 of 
1997) aim to redress this by distributing water in a manner that facilitates social and 
economic development, emphasises access for black South Africans (and black women in 
particular) and recognises the need to protect rivers’ ecological integrity. There is little 
information, however, on the opportunity cost of such water. 
In the USA Taylor and Young (1995) illustrated the intensity of competition for 
water in Crowley County, Colorado. Calculating the direct benefits foregone by 
removing 50% of irrigation at $0.0177/m
3 while the competing marginal municipal value 
was $0.2200/m
3, they implied that water trade would raise the market-clearing water 
price. In California, Schmidt and Plaut (1993) predicted that unrestricted water trading 
would increase agricultural water prices by less than 5%. Since irrigation uses 80% of the 
resource and the demand elasticity for irrigation water being at least twice that of 
residential water, a small price increase is needed to release the water required by 
municipal users. Water trading data from the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy 
District show that scarcity increases prices over time (Cummings and Nercissiantz, 
1992). Moreover, since most trades are between farmers, they refute the idea that all 
agricultural water values are low. Historical prices confirmed this; real water prices in 
1980 being three times those in 1985. These high prices are particularly significant since 
the area produces mostly annual crops.   3
In South Africa, Backeberg (1995), Armitage et al. (1999) and Nieuwoudt (2000) 
argued that tradable water permits would increase commercial irrigation efficiency, 
allocating water to the most productive user. This paper compares the marginal value of 
irrigation water in the Fish-Sundays Scheme of the Eastern Cape to the cost of creating 
additional capacity in the system. The Fish-Sundays Scheme comprises those reaches of 
the Great Fish and Sundays Rivers supplied from Gariep Dam on the Orange River, but 
through other inter-basin transfers the Orange basin also supplies the parts of the country. 
The inter-basin transfer of 560 million m
3/year provides over 95% of the water in the 
recipient system (Basson, 1999). Competition for water is extensive. Locally irrigators 
compete with industrial and residential users, the environment and subsistence farmers, 
and through inter-basin transfers they compete with users in the industrial and mining 
heartland of the country in the Vaal basin. Additional capacity is primarily needed to 
meet growing urban demand in the Vaal basin. 
The existing “no trade” scenario is compared to two levels of farmer-to-farmer 
trade. Results indicate that water trade between the Scheme’s farmers would increase 
average water value by over60% and reinforce Taylor and Young’s 1995result that 
irrigators sustain small losses when water is diverted to other uses. At an offer price equal 
to the cost of phase I of additional developments in the Orange basin over three quarters 
of the water would be released. At a price equal to the marginal cost of developing phase 
II farmers would sell all their water entitlements.   4
 
Methods 
The model compares the costs and benefits of intra- and inter-basin water 
transfers. The marginal value of irrigation benefits forgone is calculated for a range of 
quantities. It is also known that incremental capacity can be added in two phases – phase 
I will generate 315 million m
3/year at R0.05/m
3/year and Phase II will produce 850 
million m
3/year at R1.27/m
3/year (Basson, 1999). Although the benefits of non-
agricultural uses are difficult to estimate, assumptions can be made about the quantities 
involved. Since these should be supplied from the cheapest source, irrigation values then 
provide a threshold value for alternative users.  
The model of commercial irrigation consists of a suite of sixteen static linear 
programmes aggregated to basin level following a postal survey of all irrigation permit 
holders (response rate 24%). The models were populated by activity data (in table 1) 
collected from farmers and local agricultural experts (Conradie, 2002). Technologies 
reflect current practices. The models reflect 35 000ha of fodder crops in the Great Fish 
River basin and 15 000ha of citrus along the Lower Sundays River.  
Farm size and resource mix determine the farm classes. Irrigation and stock farms 
both have 85ha irrigated land, but stock farm comprise 2 540ha rangeland while the 
irrigation farm has almost no rangeland. Dairy farms are essentially irrigation farms that 
keep dairy cows instead of sheep and angoras. Farm businesses are large multi-owner 
units with more stock and crop activities than other farms. Citrus farms are differentiated 
according to size, and replant rates. Small mixed (29ha) and large stable (112ha) citrus   5
farms are barely maintaining the investment in citrus, while small expanding (50ha) and 
large expanding (195ha) citrus farms grow at 4%/year. 
 
Table 1: Enterprise data by farm model 
     
Enterprise  1999 R/ha  Modelled in farm types 
Maize  (1831) – (2983)  Irrigation, stock, dairy, farm business 
Lucerne  (2425) – (4990) Irrigation, stock, dairy, farm business, 
  small mixed citrus farms 
Grass pasture  (934) – (2086) Dairy 
Dry beans  1240 – 3878 Irrigation, stock, farm business 
Potatoes  5443 – 8766 Farm business, small mixed citrus 
Citrus  2210 – 3368 Small mixed, small expanding, large 
  stable, large expanding citrus farms 
  
  1999 R/Large stock unit 
Wool sheep  901 – 1586 Irrigation, stock, farm business 
Angora goats  1184 – 1398 Irrigation, stock, farm business 
Ostriches 2147 Farm  business 
Dairy cows  4848 Dairy, small mixed citrus farms 
  
* Exchange rate: US$1 = R10 
 
Fodder crops were modelled to have transfer activities to dairy cows and 
ostriches, and wool sheep and mohair goats operated at four intensity levels. Maize 
production is modelled separately from maize harvesting. If ensiled, it supplies dairy and 
if reaped as grain it can be sold at R600/ton or fed to livestock. Lucerne hay is fed to 
livestock or sold at between R326/ton and R337/ton depending on quality. Potatoes and 
dry beans are cash crops. Four citrus varieties are modelled to reflect differences in 
income and input requirement. Rotational requirements and replant rates of perennial 
crops were specified exogenously – as for example in Louw and Van Schalkwyk (1997) – 
but all other fixed factors except water, are endogenous. 
The water constraint is modelled in mm/ha/year using pre-1999 farm level quotas. 
Duplicate irrigation activities model capital-water substitution, but management-water   6
substitution, as implemented by Gardner and Young (1988) and Booker (1990), was 
ignored. Data inadequacy and the scope of the project precluded the modelling of 
management responses to growing water scarcity for a given technology. Flood irrigation 
still dominates fodder production, while citrus growers have converted to micro irrigation 
to improve fruit quality and save labour. Since the change to micro irrigation is 
irreversible, other technologies are not modelled on citrus farms. Parametric changes of 
the water constraint generate marginal water values, total water value being the integral 
of the marginal water value function. Since the model has no other fixed factors, the 
objective function also measures total water value. 
The model isolates water values using a Ricardian framework, all other inputs, 
including risk taking, being rewarded at a fair value. Labour is hired in at R3.97/hour in 
one-month blocks. Management, two classes of land and farming infrastructure are rented 
by the hectare assuming constant returns to scale. Risk is modelled in a MOTAD 
formulation, which penalises the objective function by a sum of negative deviations in 
historical profit (Hazell, 1971). The modeller chooses the intensity of the penalty by 
selecting a risk coefficient. Risk coefficients are used to calibrate models to observed 
enterprise mixes. The model maximises returns to water instead of returns to all fixed 
factors in order to find a lower bound – rather than an upper bound – to water value. The 
model’s weakness is that a reduction in profit – arising from say a wage increase – more 
than proportionately affects water values, while such loss would in reality be absorbed 
across all factors.   7
 
Results 
Water comes into the fodder-producing area on the banks of the Great Fish River 
between Steynsburg in the north and Cookhouse in the south. At Cookhouse 126 million 
m
3/year is transferred on to the Sundays River where citrus is grown south of Kirkwood. 
The Kirkwood supply is connected to the Nelson Mandela Municipality (formerly Port 
Elizabeth) where urban demand is concentrated. Current residential and industrial use is 
reported to be 16 million m
3/year and is projected to grow to 65 million m
3/year by 2030, 
of which 25.1 million m
3/year can be accommodated given existing infrastructure 
(Basson, 1999). According to the Scheme manager the ecological requirement, of 
between 63 and 69 million m
3/year, is still unappropriated in the river (Crafford, personal 
communication, 1999). The Scheme also serves 644ha of smallholder plots worth 8.3 
million m
3/year, but this demand unlikely to grow in future. Industry and municipal users 
outside the basin are far more significant competitors for Fish-Sundays water than any of 
the equity stakeholders inside the basin. The tunnel is not a binding constraint since it is 
unlikely that the inter-basin transfer will be increased. Distribution in the fodder 
producing area is not constrained either, since the river is the delivery channel, but further 
supplies to the citrus area is constrained to 18 million m
3/year. The limited trade 
scenarios enforce the citrus constraint and the unrestricted trade scenarios disregard it. 
The existing allocation of 578.2 million m
3/year generates a total water value of 
R24.47 million/year for commercial irrigation. Table 2 shows both water value by farm 
type and whether a farm is likely to be a buyer or seller. A marginal value of zero 
indicates that the existing water constraint is non-binding; making this class of farm a   8
potential seller of water. If the marginal value of water is positive the farm will buy water 
at the margin. The existing quota and the potential change in quantity demanded are also 
reported. Irrigation farms in Cradock and Cookhouse/ Somerset East would be expected 
to sell 28.35 and 62.08 million m
3/year respectively, were trading allowed. Stock farms in 
Cradock would sell a further 11.69 million m
3/year. Removing all constraints, including 
the restriction on the inter-basin transfer, increases net water demand by 25%. 
 
Table 2: The existing allocation of water to commercial irrigation 
 Marginal  Average  Quantity  Change 
Farm type  Value  Value  Allocated  in demand 
  1999 R/m
3/year Million  m
3/year 
      
Irrigation farms      
   Middelburg  0.0011 0.0028      74.59        86.74  
   Cradock   –   0.0035      33.28   (28.35) 
Cookhouse/ Somerset East   –   0.0003      70.13   (62.08) 
    
Stock farms    
   Middelburg  0.0067 0.0081      60.82          5.97  
   Cradock   –   0.0070      28.69   (11.69) 
Cookhouse/ Somerset East  0.0014 0.0034      38.25        13.73  
    
Dairy farms    
   Middelburg  0.0427 0.0412           -               -    
   Cradock  0.0427 0.0427      18.36        15.57  
Cookhouse/ Somerset East  0.0612 0.0378      19.13        13.55  
    
Farm businesses    
   Middelburg  0.0070 0.0076      17.01        10.51  
   Cradock  0.0120 0.0429      28.35        37.00  
Cookhouse/ Somerset East  0.0163 0.0500      63.00        29.13  
    
Citrus farms    
   Small mixed  0.1525 0.1525      28.97        10.09  
   Large stable  0.0352 0.0352      33.26        13.99  
   Small expanding  0.2862 0.2862      36.90        11.37  
   Large expanding  0.3435 0.0435      31.59          9.12  
      
Total    0.0423     578.20       154.67  
   9
Without trade the average value of irrigation water is R0.0423/m
3/year, 15% less 
than the cost of phase I of construction. To avoid phase I about half the inter-basin 
transfer would have to be kept back in the Orange River basin. The Government can do 
that by scaling back farmer allocations in the Fish-Sundays Scheme proportionally, even 
without allowing trading between farmers. Table 3 shows that a 50% reduction of the 
inter-basin transfer without allowing farmer-to-farmer trading will increase the average 
value of remaining water to R0.0797/m
3/year, since individual farmers will discontinue 
low value crops. Total water value falls by a mere 3% to R23.78 million/year as a result.  
 
Table 3: Water values in 1999 Rand for three trade and two transfer levels 
  100% inter-basin transfer  50% inter-basin transfer 
  No  Citrus Unrestr. No  Citrus Unrestr.
  trade limit Trade  Trade limit trade 
        
Volume mil m
3/year 578.2  578.2 578.2 298.2 298.2  298.2
% volume – citrus   22%  22% 30% 45% 43%  59%
    
Value R million/year  24.47  39.36 41.58 23.78 30.20  32.56
% value – citrus   71%  64% 66% 73% 83%  84%
    
    
Average value – R/m
3  0.0423 0.0681 0.0719 0.0797 0.1013 0.1092
Marginal value –R/m
3    
   Fodder    0.0014 0.0015 0.0163  0.0163
   Citrus    0.0352 0.0015 0.0352  0.0163
    
 
It is not the ability to move water to citrus per se that raises the water value, but 
rather the ability to pick the more efficient farms within an area. For example, table 3 
shows that the share of the water used in citrus remains unchanged if trade up to the 
citrus constraint is allowed. At this constraint small mixed, small expanding and large 
expanding citrus farms are buying water while large stable citrus farms are selling their 
current allocation. The net demand for the citrus area is less than 3 million m
3/year, but   10
partial trade eliminates an entire class of producer and increases value dramatically. 
Furthermore, the share of value generated by citrus falls, implying efficiency gains 
among fodder producers too. However, the bottom two rows of table 3 show that the 
citrus constraint is binding since the canal capacity precludes the marginal value of water 
from equalling across the entire Scheme. Were the citrus constraint removed, large stable 
citrus farms would become buyers again, raising the share of water utilised by citrus 
farmers to 30% of available supplies. The impact of this change on value is marginal, 
suggesting that few low value fodder producers would remain. The second scenario in 
table 3 considers the effects of reducing the inter-basin transfer by half to replace phase I 
of further developments in the Orange basin. If trading is not permitted, a 50% cut in 
supply will cause average water values to rise dramatically, total value to fall marginally 
and water to be released mostly from fodder production. If permitted to trade up to the 
citrus constraint, the citrus area rearranges its production internally as before. The share 
of value generated by citrus now increases to 83% indicating that there are few gains 
from farmer-to-farmer sales among remaining fodder producers. Removing the citrus 
constraint draws slightly more water to citrus but creates little additional value. 
Instead of just considering two levels of inter-basin transfer, Table 4 shows the 
quantities released from the irrigation sector at a range of offer prices, as well as the 
cumulative percentage water released for the Scheme as a whole. In general, fodder 
producers are willing to sell water at lower prices than citrus growers, and more water 
will be released from the irrigation sector if farmer-to-farmer sales are not allowed than if 
permitted. If farmers can trade among themselves, efficient irrigators will buy water from 
low value producers, thus keeping water in the irrigation sector. Conversely, if no trading   11
is permitted, unused water has no value. The first 101.45 million m
3/year, or 18% of the 
current allocation to the Scheme, will be released by the irrigation sector at a very small 
positive price, but trading increases the marginal value of water to at least R0.0014/m
3. 
At R0.0014/m
3 intra-irrigation demand is satisfied and the irrigation sector starts to sell 
water to non-agricultural users in the recipient and source basins. 
 
Table 4: Willingness to sell in million m
3 at various prices with and without trade 
Price  No trade  Limited trade 
R/m
3/year Fodder  Citrus  %  Fodder  Citrus  % 
0.0000  101.45           -     18%        
0.0005  101.45           -     18%   
0.0014  133.98           -     23%  4.89          -     1% 
0.0015  137.97           -     24%  41.52          -     7% 
0.0017  170.18           -     29%             46.04          -     8% 
0.0018  174.68           -     30%  73.47          -     13% 
0.0030  202.14           -     35%  102.10          -     18% 
0.0032  206.47           -     36%  102.43          -     18% 
0.0045  206.79           -     36%  105.17          -     18% 
0.0054  207.45           -     36%  109.09          -     19% 
0.0070  252.64           -     44%  168.27          -     29% 
0.0076  253.76           -     44%  168.27          -     29% 
0.0080  270.11           -     47%  186.95          -     32% 
0.0082  272.82           -     47%  191.92          -     33% 
0.0111  277.80           -     48%  210.44          -     36% 
0.0120  296.18           -     51%  245.89          -     42% 
0.0163  320.25           -     55%  330.46          -     57% 
0.0203  375.14           -     65%  332.18          -     57% 
0.0251  377.37           -     65%  345.01          -     59% 
0.0290  378.49           -     65%  346.05          -     59% 
0.0352  379.52           -     66%  346.89          -     60% 
0.0389 379.52  32.82 71%  356.39 20.68  65% 
0.0427 385.06  32.82 72%  370.39 20.68  66% 
0.0435 403.83  32.82 76%  388.75 29.81  72% 
0.0437 403.83  64.33 81%  388.97 61.40  77% 
0.0456 404.05  64.33 81%  390.59 61.40  78% 
0.0844 424.88  64.33 85%  427.05 72.16  86% 
0.1161 442.25  64.33 88%  428.57 72.16  86% 
0.1818 443.30  93.21 93%  428.62 105.95  92% 
0.2698 443.40  93.21 93%  428.62 105.95  92% 
0.3577 443.49 129.97 99%  428.62 111.83  93% 
0.4692 444.72 129.97 99%  432.43 111.83  93% 
0.9347 447.09 129.97 100%  432.79 111.83  94%   12
The most interesting trend in table 4 is how little water is really used efficiently in 
irrigation in the Fish-Sundays Scheme. The bulk of the current allocation to irrigation is 
worth less than R0.03/m
3/year and more than three quarters of the water would be 
released at the construction cost of phase I (R0.05/m
3/year). Thus reducing irrigation may 
be a cost effective alternative to further dam construction. Furthermore, table 3 indicates 
that were irrigation in the Fish-Sundays Scheme scaled down by half, a core of very 
productive irrigation would remain, generating total values similar to those achieved 
under current conditions. The foregone irrigation benefits are a function of trading 
arrangements. The effect of a 50% cut in a trading environment would be a 20% 
reduction in total water value. In a non-trading environment the fall would only be 3% 
though from a far lower base. 
 
Policy implications and conclusion 
This paper produced several policy relevant results, the most important of which 
is the beneficial effect of allowing the market to allocate water to more efficient 
irrigators. While, improved efficiency gained through trading increases the overall benefit 
derived from the scarce resource, it makes it harder to argue that irrigation should release 
water. If farmer-to-farmer trade is not allowed, the opportunity cost of water to a given 
farmer is restricted to the production possibilities available to him. For the bulk of the 
Fish-Sundays Scheme those production possibilities are marginal fodder production that 
generates low water values. Freedom to sell his water permit increases the opportunity 
cost of a farmer’s water to reflect the production possibilities faced by the best of his 
fellow farmers. A market creates the incentive to put water to its optimal use.   13
The data in table 4 does more than show the implications of reduced water 
transfers to the Fish-Sundays Scheme. Not only does it show the possibility of avoiding 
dam construction on the Orange, it also provides policy makers with an easy reference for 
the marginal benefits of irrigation water. These should be compared to the expected 
marginal benefit from any other water use, inside or outside the basin. For example, if the 
Eastern Cape Government wants to settle subsistence farmers on 12 000ha land that 
requires 150 million m
3/year, they know that they will have to pay between R0.0015 and 
R0.005/m
3/year depending on whether farmer-to-farmer sales are possible or not. 
Similarly, an allocation of 24 million m
3/year for environmental purposes would cost 
R0.0015/m
3/year. When the required volume of water can be bought at a cost justified by 
the expected benefits, the proposed reform is likely to be efficiency enhancing. 
A final warning is needed to place this result in context. The framework used here 
supposes a national accounting stance and hides the indirect effects of irrigation in the 
region. The results do not extend to the value of agricultural output or the number of jobs 
created under the various scenarios; the indirect effects of the various water reform 
strategies are therefore omitted. Not being able to assess employment effects is a 
significant weakness in a province that is the second poorest in the country and where 
half of the economically active population are unemployed (Stats SA, 1999; Stats SA, 
2000). In this case a national accounting stance based on direct impacts only, would 
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